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Information & Management xxx (2007) xxx-xxx

INFORMATION
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MANAGEMENT

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Investigating recognition-based performance in an open content community: A social capital perspective

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Received 24 March 2005; received in revised form 10 May 2006; accepted 21 December 2006

Abstract

As the open source movement grows, it becomes important to understand the dynamics that affect the motivation of participants who contribute their time freely to such projects. One important motivation that has been identified is the desire for formal recognition in the open source community. We investigated the impact of social capital in participants' social networks on their recognition-based performance; i.e., the formal status they are accorded in the community. We used a sample of 465 active participants in the Wikipedia open content encyclopedia community to investigate the effects of two types of social capital and found that *network closure*, measured by direct and indirect ties, had a significant positive effect on increasing participants' recognition-based performance. *Structural holes* had mixed effects on participants' status, but were generally a source of social capital.

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Keywords: Social networks; Social capital; Open content; Open source software; Recognition-based performance; Social status; Virtual communities

1. Introduction

The open source movement is a puzzle to those who are more comfortable with the traditional economic model of software development, where a large fixed cost of development is offset by mass distribution under strictly controlled intellectual property licenses. Obviously, participants in open source projects are not economically motivated [52]. As the movement continues to grow, it becomes important to examine the social fabric of the communities to better understand how and why they "work".

A number of studies have considered what incentives motivate participants in open source projects [23,24,32]. One highlighted the participants' desire to be recognized in their virtual community of open source participants. This occurs when a participant receives informal praise and acknowledgment from their fellows, and also by tangible tokens such as recognition in the open source communities by the granting of administrative, or "insider", rights that permit high-quality contributors to add their changes directly with minimal prior review, and to have an important role in deciding the direction of the project. Thus the action is equivalent to promoting an employee to manager status in a traditional organization and thus is a recognition of achievements.

Our study therefore investigated how *social capital* [8,15,21,35] in the community influenced an OSS participant's recognition-based performance. Because

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open source communities operate under *social structures* [12], social capital theory provided a valuable perspective for understanding how participants leveraged social resources to achieve their performance objectives. More specifically, we asked: Do the virtual connections through which open content participants operate influence their performance?

We addressed this question by examining the activities of Wikipedia (<http://en.wikipedia.org>, a general encyclopedia), currently the largest open source content community, because its members span every aspect of the human demography and anyone with Internet access may access and contribute to it.

2. Open source software and social capital

Though open source activities have been practiced since the mid-1980s, when the Free Software Foundation was founded, little research has been attempted to try to maximize its benefits.

2.1. Open source software (OSS)

The emergence of open source software has changed the technological landscape of the computing industry, affecting the strategic dynamics of some commercial enterprises, including interactions among proprietary software developers, hardware manufacturers, and makers of network products [51]. OSS has been defined as “software that is made freely available to all”; it is often developed and maintained by many contributors scattered around the world, but they interact through a virtual community. The majority of these public-good producers contribute freely to the project in return for only intrinsic rewards.

However, “freedom” has a particular meaning in open source contexts: “Free [open source] software is a matter of the users’ freedom to run, copy, distribute, study, change and improve the software” [48], as opposed to *freeware*, which is software provided at no price. An OSS license often permits sale of the product or a system developed from or with it, with the caveat that the buyer be informed of his or her right to full access to the source code at no charge, instead of, or in addition to, paying for compiled executable programs.

2.1.1. Motivations for participating in OSS projects

Research on OSS has mainly focused on dimensions such as the economic and sociological foundations, motivational issues of participants, and its managerial and legal aspects. Von Hippel and von Krogh consider OSS developed a “private-collective” innovative model,

and illustrated how it deviated from private investment and collective action models. They believed that the “private-collective” model offered “the best of both worlds” by resolving problems such as revelation of innovations developed by private funds and the free-riding phenomenon. From the perspectives of labor economics and industrial organization, Lerner and Tirole examined OSS economics and argued that signaling incentives (career concern incentives, future job opportunities and ego gratification) were the main drivers of the volunteers’ participation. These authors also discussed the importance of leadership due to the unique management structure of open source organizations and the competitive dynamics between open and commercial software development.

Drawing from the extended Klandermans model of voluntary action [28], Hertel et al. explored the factors that motivated the participation of volunteers. Some of these factors, based on a Web-survey of 141 participants, included *pragmatic* (e.g., improving the Linux kernel for personal advantages), *social* (i.e., supporting the work with other volunteers), and *hedonic* motives (i.e., intrinsic motivations). Bonaccorsi and Rossi [5] discussed several economic issues, such as motivation, coordination and diffusion from the perspectives of collective action, governance structure, and network externalities, respectively.

In open source projects, it is necessary to consider the performance of the participating developers, since most are volunteers with individual motivations for participation. Aligning performance measures with motivations would be helpful to organizers and evaluators of OSS projects. According to the resource-based model of social structure sustainability, online social structures should provide members with positive benefits, such as the opportunity to be influential [55], to affiliate or champion [37], and the ability to disseminate ideas rapidly [27]. While not absolutely necessary for participation, it is very important for open source participants to be recognized for their contributions [48]; thus they gain status and respect in the community. To better encourage participation in open source projects, research is needed to understand the dynamics of recognition as an incentive, and how the attainment of this motivation serves as an indication of a participant’s performance, in the sense that they have achieved a desired individual goal.

2.1.2. OSS and open content encyclopedias

An important feature of OSS communities is that there is limited opportunity for participation for those who are not capable programmers: non-programmer

152 members typically do not have the same status (such
153 as voting rights on important design issues). OSS
154 projects form virtual communities in which people
155 interact to achieve a common goal; the communities
156 have power structures, norms, values, and traditions.
157 However, most are somewhat narrow in their scope of
158 contributors [30], being limited to skilled computer
159 programmers.

160 We examined a particular type of OSS whose
161 characteristics draw from an almost universal spectrum
162 of people—the open content encyclopedia (OCE),
163 which allows almost anyone to contribute to it, and that
164 permits modification and distribution of its content.
165 Quality is loosely maintained by applying Linus’ Law
166 [38]: “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow”.
167 With thousands of contributors, erroneous and poor
168 quality content is removed and only good quality
169 content is retained. Wikipedia is by far the most
170 extensive and best known, but there are others, such as
171 ISpedia and the Enciclopedia Libre Universal en
172 Español. OCEs are based on the Wiki concept, a
173 Web technology that allows viewers to add content to
174 Web pages using minimal technical skills. OCEs are
175 released with a license that permits the free redistribu-
176 tion and modification of their content: Wikipedia uses
177 the GNU Free Documentation License, the textual
178 complement to the GNU General Public License for
179 traditional OSS.

180 OCEs are structured to eliminate or minimize
181 individual agendas and strive towards public welfare
182 in setting policies for the development of their products.
183 Their organizational structure is somewhat anarchistic,
184 but there is some central administration. However, by
185 employing Wiki technology, OCEs remove the techni-
186 cal barrier to access that exists in traditional OSS
187 communities. Participants only need to be computer
188 literate and have access to the Internet. A new
189 mechanism related to the development of OCEs is
190 being spearheaded by the creative commons (CC, <http://www.creativecommons.org>), a resource that creates
191 licenses on demand for literary, audio, and video works;
192 it allows creators of content to choose among several
193 groups of intellectual property rights under which they
194 can license their works.

195 3. Social capital and social networks

197 The principle idea of social capital theory is simple
198 and straightforward: social relationships, norms, and
199 values [36] attached to social capital determine the
200 performance of individuals, groups and organizations
201 who are part of a socially or economically connected

202 network [31,56]. While “performance” is sometimes
203 conceptualized in objective terms, such as salary and
204 promotions, it is more often measured in terms of
205 subjective recognition-based measures such as organi-
206 zational influence, and peer acknowledgement; this
207 corresponds with our focus on recognition-based
208 performance in OCEs. Many studies have examined
209 how individuals invest in social relations and how they
210 access and exploit the resources [40]. But many others
211 have placed a greater emphasis on group-level issues
212 related to social capital. Bourdieu and Wacquant [7] and
213 Putnam [42] studied the process by which groups
214 generated and maintained social capital as a collective
215 asset, illustrating how the collective asset mutually
216 benefited the group members: see Lin for a detailed
217 review of these issues. Despite variation in the level of
218 analysis, researchers have viewed social capital as
219 “institutionalized social relations with embedded
220 resources” which can benefit both the collective and
221 the individuals in the collective.

222 Tsai and Ghoshal [49] explored the structural,
223 relational and cognitive dimensions of social capital,
224 and find that the first two significantly influenced
225 product innovation. Ahuja [1] examined three aspects
226 (direct ties, indirect ties and structural holes), of a firm’s
227 ego network (the personal network with the individual
228 as its focal point), in order to determine how a firm’s
229 inter-organizational network structure affected the
230 degree of subsequent innovation: both direct and
231 indirect ties were found to positively influence
232 innovation. Interestingly, however structural holes were
233 negatively associated with innovation. In a study of
234 biotechnology start-ups, Shan et al. [45] and Powell
235 et al. [41] examined the relationship between a firm’s
236 network position and organizational performance. They
237 found that the number of ties [47] and centrality were
238 significantly related to innovation and faster growth,
239 respectively.

240 3.1. Social capital

241 Social capital has been defined in many ways, such
242 as “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that
243 accrue to an individual or group by virtue of
244 possessing a durable network of more or less
245 institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance
246 and recognition” but despite differences in the
247 contextual application, they coalesce around a central
248 orchestrating theme that reflects the criticality of the
249 relations. Social capital theory places emphasis on
250 social relationships.

3.2. The two types of social capital

Although social capital is considered an important element of a person's success, there are two schools of thought about the mechanism by which social capital should be produced and mobilized. Fig. 1 graphically illustrates the difference. By bridging various network segments, Robert plays an important "linking-pin" role, whereas James's role is limited to heavy interaction with other people in the same sub-network.

Advocates of the *closed, dense or cohesive network view*, such as Coleman and Walker et al. [54], have argued that closure or density of social relations is the primary ingredient for the generation of social capital. They have given empirical evidence to support their perspective (e.g., a successful operation in the labor market, and the formation of informal credit associations where pooled savings are allocated on a rotating basis [33]). They argue that such network formations provide members with solid grounds that allow for the maintenance of cohesion and preservation of trust, authority, and norms; that a cohesive network can provide an infrastructure that facilitates smooth coordination and cooperation from member to member in the pursuit of their interests while reducing uncertainties [43] and increasing trust.

In contrast, Granovetter and Burt who advocate the *structural hole view*, assert that "true" social capital can be efficiently produced and maintained under open or loosely coupled networks, in which members can access the resources available in heterogeneous sub-networks. They have stated that loosely developed networks rich in structural holes allow the individuals to access and mobilize social resources and that bridges, structural holes or weaker ties are the building blocks necessary to construct or configure the network and thus produce "fresh" information while "social redundancies" are

minimized. Thus the diversity and uniqueness of information become the crucial aspects of social capital, and they require a network rich in structural holes [18]. Structural hole theory posits that closed networks hinder, rather than promote, organizational coordination [9]. Portes and Sensenbrenner claimed that instead of an asset, the social capital embedded in closed networks could become a *social liability* that hinders the organization's performance.

The two views have some similarities, however. Both presume that reciprocity is the primary driving force in creating and reproducing social capital. They also agree that cohesive relations promote and amplify reciprocity. Nonetheless, these perspectives maintain a parallel stance with respect to the effect of reciprocity on a member's coordination. The closed network theory posits that such reciprocity is a necessary component for assuring group cohesion, while the structural hole framework considers it to be *structural arthritis* [9], which deters coordination among group members.

Several sociologists [2] have attempted to resolve the conflict by stating that an explanation for the conceptual gap is truly contingent on what outcomes are expected by its members, and under what conditions they mobilize their network resources. Lin suggested, for example, that cohesive networks were more effective for "preserving or maintaining resources," while "searching for and obtaining resources" can be better managed under the open network formation rich in structural holes. In short, the effectiveness of a network structure, in terms of creating social capital would depend on either promoting the use of current resources or by acquiring new resources.

We predicted that better performance and recognition in an open content community required individual volunteers to "occupy" a network location that could leverage both types of social capital to their as much as possible. Consistent with Ahuja, we consider these types of social capital as complementary resources. Members of open content communities can only perform well and move forward if solidarity exists among the participants.

3.2.1. Effects of network closure

A closed network structure in which many connections link the ego to its *alters* (directly or indirectly) provided a solid basis on which members ensure the trustworthiness and authority of other members: the direct ties that have been created and maintained by a participant provide four benefits that help improve overall performance: knowledge sharing, complementarity, quality control, and conflict resolution. A dense




Fig. 1. The structural hole (adopted from Burt [11]).

network facilitates knowledge sharing between the participants [4], a critical asset for their performance in the open content project. In addition, intense interactions and collaboration among individuals promotes norms and trust and facilitates complementary skills [44]. Open content initiatives often require a great deal of complementarity because of their complexity.

In addition to these benefits, closed networks may serve as an effective mechanism to control the quality of member contribution and resolve potential conflicts of interests. Such a network formation structurally discourages opportunistic behavior and shirking among its members. Those densely tied tend to improve their performance, which facilitates quality control. Moreover, they are aware that their performance will likely be monitored by the alters, and thus they are more likely to feel responsible and make frequent contributions. Finally, a cohesive network rich in direct and indirect ties may facilitate the resolution of any interpersonal conflicts. Individuals who interact more frequently tend to agree on issues [29]. However, conflicts do arise in an open content project because the participants may have different background, specialty, and interests.

In the case of Wikipedia, one of the important criteria that members consider in voting for an administrator is his or her ability to work well with others in face of conflict. Thus, we expected that network density was important in encouraging members to amicably resolve disagreements with long-term colleagues.

Hypothesis 1. The greater the closure of a participant's network in an open content project, the higher the performance of the participant.

3.2.2. Effects of structural holes

Although a closed network is a necessary component for members, this may not be sufficient to elicit their optimal performance. Participants who forge ties over an extended time without being subject to "external" review are likely to suffer from knowledge deficiency and experience a cognitive lock-in [20,50]. Consequently, performance would be limited by a lack of new ideas. Moreover, relational inertia, which prevents members from forming new ties, could occur in the community with strong bonds.

In an open source community, cognitive lock-in and relational inertia may pose a great threat to the development of open content initiatives; contributors who establish direct links and make frequent interactions are likely to be "trapped in their own network" and pay less attention to the issues of those outside their network, preventing the entry of new members with

fresh ideas. Consequently, an open-network formation, which allows brokerage opportunities, provides the constituents with the platform to interact dynamically with many others, and to gain new knowledge and insights. A Wikipedian interested in adminship rights can become more "influential" in the community by playing a bridging role between otherwise separate subnetworks. By occupying such a linking positions, he or she can increase control over the information.

Hypothesis 2. The more structural hole capital a participant controls in an open project, the higher the performance of the participant.

4. Methodology

4.1. Data source

As the database for our study, we downloaded a full replication of the English-language version of Wikipedia as of 16 June 2004. This 30 GB MySQL database included the edits of over 80,000 Wikipedians (not counting the tens of thousands of anonymous contributors), representing over 300,000 articles and 2,000,000 edits. However, a network of 80,000 people is much too large for practical analysis, and the vast majority of the material would not have been relevant for our research questions. Therefore, we decided to reduce the participant list to less than 500 Wikipedians.

The components of a social network are the nodes and the ties between them. In our work, the nodes were the participants, and the ties were completed when two Wikipedians interacted when creating an article. In the Wikipedia process, different participants create articles by generating or making edits to an article page through the Wiki interface. Each article has an associated "talk page" on which participants can discuss the article, ask questions of other contributors, and thus resolve conflicts. These "talk pages" are not real-time chat rooms, but living, documented discussions. They are the primary way of communication for the virtual community of Wikipedia participants, and are used to forge a feeling of community among members [39]. In our extensive observation of the use these pages, we found that those who write comments generally read what has already been written in order to understand the state of the discussion before they make any comments themselves. Unlike newsgroups or forums, each article has a single talk page that records all the discussion; thus it is easy for contributors to access the full discussion history. However, for extremely lengthy discussions, older comments can be archived.

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Discussions on talk pages are open interactions, since contributors read and respond to each other by name. Thus, we noted a tie when two Wikipedians had written comments on the same talk page. In our study, we examined the interactions of nearly 500 Wikipedians and used their mutual editing of the main article talk pages as ways to determine the ties between them. We used queries in MySQL to compile the links, and restructured them appropriately using Microsoft Access and Excel. We weighted all ties equally: 1 if it existed, and 0 if not.

4.2. The dependent variable: administrative rights in Wikipedia

We wished to investigate the effects of social network structure on the performance of open source participants and conceptualize participant performance as the recognition of their efforts in the open source community: in our study this was measured by the increased status that attained by achieving a formal designated title: in the Wikipedia organizational unit, this is accomplished when participants are promoted to increasing levels of administratorship (*adminship*).

Wikipedia permits anyone, to edit any article and to create new articles. Participants who decided to “sign-in” can also move articles. Any Wikipedian can request administrative rights, which, according to policy, is normally accorded liberally to anyone who demonstrates that they are responsible, contributing members of the community. Adminship gives the additional rights to delete articles permanently, and to undo the revisions of the vandals who deliberately efface articles. The administrators can also protect pages from editing when a serious problem arises, and even discipline unruly Wikipedians by temporarily blocking them from access to Wikipedia. Thus promotion gives participants both senior-editor and police status.

Many contributors, however, do not seek out such privileges they: just want to contribute. Their reward is apparently the pleasure gained from contributing their knowledge and sharing in the creation of a valuable resource. Thus, we had to try to distinguish between contributors interested in administrative powers and the adminship process, and those who merely contributed. Wikipedians become administrators by a vote open to all community members (though few actually participate), after all have had the opportunity to discuss and review a nominee’s contribution history.

Beyond adminship, there are a number of super-administrator ranks. A *bureaucrat* has all administrator privileges and can appoint or depose administrators.

The highest rank is that of *steward*, which has full rights to access the entire Wikipedia database and make changes to any Wikipedians’ rights.

In our study, our dependent variable was the Wikipedians’ performance in terms of formal rights and responsibilities accorded in recognition of their contribution to the community. However, we observed that many Wikipedians were not interested in adminship. Thus, we selected only those Wikipedians who had shown an interest in the adminship process—indicated by their contribution to the page “Requests for adminship,” which included all those who had ever been nominated (including those self-nominated), had commented on nominees, had contributed to the formulation of adminship policy, or had made any other comment on either the “Requests for adminship” project page or on its associate talk pages. Through this process, 512 Wikipedians were identified. However, of these, only 465 participated in talk pages of English Wikipedia articles, so this was our population. Of course, this sample does not represent the whole set of Wikipedia contributors.

Our dependent variable consisted of four consecutive categories that covered the 465 subjects: there were 181 regular Wikipedians without administrative rights, 257 with simple administrative rights, 18 bureaucrats, and 9 stewards. Because of the distribution of this variable, we could group the sample into either two categories (181 regular Wikipedians and 284 administrators) or three categories (181 regular Wikipedians, 257 simple administrators, and 27 super-administrators). We used both categorizations in our analysis.

4.3. Independent variables: measures of social network structure

We used UCINET [6] to compute social network variables for structural holes and network closure, obtained from the social network data generated from the MySQL queries. Building on Ahuja’s research framework, we used direct and indirect ties to represent the network closure of each ego’s network. This counted the number of direct partners of the focal firm and the number of other firms to which it was tied (at a path distance of two or greater) in order to operationalize the constructs of direct ties and indirect ties, respectively. To compute a count of direct ties, we assessed the number of direct collaborators of each participant in the sample. The number of indirect ties was based on the number of other collaborators in a particular Wikipedia network to which it was tied at path distances of two or greater.

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539 Network size, density, and hierarchy, on the other
540 hand, represented the structural holes in each ego's
541 network, along with the constraint as a composite
542 index. To derive the numerical indices for each
543 component, we used the procedures specified in
544 Burt's article [10] (Table 1): he had used these three
545 components as separate independent variables in an
546 effort to explore the gender differences in social capital.
547 Network size referred to the number of contacts in a
548 network. An inverse relationship existed between the
549 degree of network constraint and the size of a network
550 because any participant's relational intensity in terms
551 of time and energy with one particular collaborator
552 diminished as the number of contacts increased Burt
553 argued that network size was positively associated with
554 performance because individuals attached to a network
555 can obtain diverse information as the number of
556 contacts increases. Similarly, a Wikipedian's perform-
557 ance (in terms of receiving peer recognition)
558 increased as the size of the network increased. Density
559 indicated the average strength of connection in an ego
560 network. If a Wikipedian formed a dense network by
561 working closely with only a limited number of colla-
562 borators, he or she would not be "globally" recognized.

563 Finally, hierarchy denoted the extent to which node
564 connections were concentrated in one central contact.
565 Burt operationalized hierarchy through the use of the
566 Coleman-Theil disorder index [14], which was mea-
567 sured by the sum of the average level of constraint

567 multiplied by its natural logarithm, quantity divided by
568 the maximum sum possible:

$$\frac{\sum_j (c_{ij} / (C/N)) \ln(c_{ij} / (C/N))}{N \ln(N)} \quad 569$$

570 where C_{ij} is the degree of constraint for i posed by
571 contact j , C the sum of constraint across all N relation-
572 ships, N the number of contacts in an ego network and
573 C/N is the mean level of constraint per contact.
574

575 In our study, C_{ij} represented the degree of constraint
576 to Wikipedian i posed by Wikipedian j due to their
577 hierarchical relationship. For example, a participant's
578 opportunity to receive a wide peer-recognition decreased
579 when

- 580 (1) he or she committed a large investment of time and
581 energy in reaching Wikipedian j and
582
- 583 (2) j had few structural holes. Indeed, Wikipedians i and
584 j may have interacted with a similar pool of "local"
585 Wikipedians, thereby severely constraining i 's
586 capacity to expand globally.
587

590 4.4. Control variables


591 The two major considerations given when voting for
592 adminship are the quality of a Wikipedian's contribu-
593 tion, and his or her ability to judiciously and calmly
594 resolve conflicts with other Wikipedians, especially

Table 1
Variable description

Social capital	Component	Description (see [1,8] for mathematical formulas)
Network closure	Direct ties	A direct connection, from the ego's perspective, between the ego and another member (an alter) of the same network
	Indirect ties	An indirect connection, from the ego's perspective, between the ego and an alter; a connection that is mediated by one or more other alters
Structural holes (components)	Network size	The number of alters in the ego's network, not including the ego, adjusted by subtracting the average degree of alters in the network. The larger the network, the higher the chances that there are some structural holes present; thus the greater the performance
	Density	An indication of the degree to which an ego's alters are connected to each other. Since density indicates that there are fewer structural holes to exploit, the structural hole argument indicates that density is negatively related to performance
	Hierarchy	The degree to which the connections in a network are concentrated in one person. Hierarchy is hypothesized to have a negative effect on performance since an ego has relatively fewer structural holes to exploit
Structural holes (aggregated)	Constraint	"The extent to which a network is directly or indirectly concentrated in a single contact" [8]. As a result, the lower the network constraint, the higher the number of structural holes existing within the network. This is single index encompasses the size, density, and hierarchy dimensions. Since Burt argues that structural holes are a source of social capital, he hypothesizes that constraint should be negatively related to individual performance

594 when they are themselves involved in the conflict.
595 Unfortunately for our analysis, these are highly quali-
596 tative measures, and it was impractical to analyze the
597 hundreds of thousands of edits that the selected
598 Wikipedians had made and then to try to code these
599 values. In lieu of qualitative control variables, we tested
600 the effects of a number of quantitative proxies in
601 association with our social network variables to test
602 their effect on the Wikipedians’ performance; specifi-
603 cally we tested the effects of the:

- 605 • *total number of edits* that a Wikipedian had made to
606 articles;
- 608 • *length of membership* as measured from the date of
609 his or her first article contribution;
- 610 • *average number of edits* made, as was the ratio of the
611 preceding two measures;
- 612 • *number of distinct articles* to which the Wikipedian
613 had contributed.

614 We used MySQL queries to obtain all these values
615 from the Wikipedia database. Although not a proxy of
616 quality, we also calculated the *number of other*
617  *Wikipedians* among our 465 with whom the focal
618 Wikipedian had *interacted on an article talk page*.

619 We also adapted a proxy quality measure from Lih,
620 who used the ratio of the number of edits to an article to
621 the number of unique contributors as a measure he
622 termed the “rigor” of an article, indicating the number
623 of individuals who worked on (and peer-reviewed) it. As
624 an analogous measure, we computed the ratio of a
625 Wikipedian’s total number of edits to the number of
626 distinct articles to which the Wikipedian had con-
627 tributed as the “degree of focus” of the Wikipedian in
628 contributing to articles.

634 5. Data analysis and results

635 Our dependent variable was categorized as being split
636 into three consecutive classes, or in two. We tested the
637 two-category form (regular Wikipedians, administrators)
638 using logistic regression, which was an appropriate
639 analytical technique with continuous independent vari-
640 ables and a binary dependent one [22]. (The use of
641 multiple discriminant analysis would have been inap-
642 propriate for this analysis, as it requires continuous
643 independent variables and a categorical, non-ordinal
644 dependant variable—the inverse of ANOVA.) For the
645 three-category form (regular Wikipedians, simple
646 administrators, and super-administrators), we tried to
647 use both multinomial ordinal logit and multinomial
648 ordinal probit regression procedures; these are appro-

648 appropriate for data that is multinomial (more than two values)
649 or ordinal (in successive rank order of magnitude) but not
650 interval (values between data points are unevenly
651 spaced). However, the results with such analyses were
652 virtually identical to those achieved when we used
653 multiple linear regression (which assumes interval
654 data—that the distance between a regular Wikipedian
655 and a simple administrator is the same as the distance
656 between a simple administrator and a super-adminis-
657 trator). Because linear multiple regression was simpler to
658 report and interpret, we will only discuss the results of the
659 linear multiple regression and logistic regression here.
660 However, we have shown the results of the ordinal
661 multinomial logit regression in a table for comparison.
662

663 For our analysis, we began by creating a base model
664 that consisted of the control variables that had
665 significant effect on the dependent variable: the rights.
666 After regressing total edits, length of membership,
667 average edits, number of distinct articles, and the
668 “degree of focus” measure, we found that only the
669 length of membership and the total number of edits
670 together provided a significant model. We only show the
671 results of this final base model in Table 2.

672 The negative effect of the first edit was expected,
673 since the earlier the date of a Wikipedian’s first edit, the
674 longer he or she has been a member, and his or her status
675 would be expected to be higher. Also, the greater the
676 total number of edits, the higher would be the
677 participant’s status. The log likelihood (–2LL) is an
678 estimation of the goodness of logistic model fit, with
679 lower values being better. Conversely, higher R^2 values
680 for linear regression indicate better model fit. –2LL is
681 χ^2 -distributed with the degrees of freedom equal to the
682 number of independent variables in the model. The χ^2
683 of the base model (103.9 for –2LL = 517.7 at 2 degrees
684 of freedom) gave us a benchmark against which to
685 compare our social network models.

686 A regression of the network closure variables on
687 adminship with the control variables indicated a high
688 degree of multicollinearity among the two (variance
689 inflation factor [VIF] for direct ties was 34.34 and
690 indirect ties was 34.06, both much larger than the
691 recommended maximum of 4.0–5.0), resulting from their
692 high (0.985) correlation. Thus, we regressed each of them
693 separately. In Table 3, we only show the regression for
694 direct ties, as the results for indirect ties are almost
695 identical. Both linear and logistic regressions showed that
696 network closure as expressed by ties was statistically
697 significantly related to adminship ($p < 0.001$ for direct
698 ties). The effect was positive, indicating that the greater
699 the closure of a Wikipedian’s personal network, as
700 measured by direct (or indirect) ties, the more likely it

Table 2
Base model results

Adminship	Linear regression		Logistic regression		Ordinal logit	
	Coef.	$p > t $	Coef.	$p > z $	Coef.	$p > z $
First edit	0.01	0.000***	-0.002	0.000***	-0.002	0.000***
Total edits	0.000	0.000***	0.000	0.000***	0.000	0.000***
Constant	23.0	0.000***	80.0	0.000***		
$R^2 = 0.18$; adjusted $R^2 = 0.17$; $p > F = 0.000$ ***			$-2LL = 517.7$; χ^2 (2 d.f.) = 103.9; $p > \chi^2 = 0.000$ ***		$-2LL = 705.9$; χ^2 (2 d.f.) = 94.2; $p > \chi^2 = 0.000$ ***	

*** $p < 0.01$.

was that they would have higher administrative status. The linear model had an adjusted R^2 of 0.242, and the logistic model has a $-2LL$ of 490.6. We tested whether this model added any explanatory power beyond our base model by comparing the χ^2 of the two. The difference in χ^2 was $131.0 - 103.9 = 27.1$, which is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) at $3 - 2 = 1$ degree of freedom (the difference in degrees of freedom of the two models). This confirmed that the network closure model did indeed explain Wikipedians' adminship status beyond the base model of control variables.

Regressing the structural holes variables on adminship showed slightly different results between the linear and the logistic models (Table 4). In both, the effective size of the ego's network was significantly related ($p < 0.001$), and hierarchy was not significantly related ($p = 0.137$ linear, and 0.183 logistic). However, our linear model indicated that density was significantly and negatively related ($p = 0.021$), whereas the logistic model indicated that its relation, though also negative, was not significant ($p = 0.137$). This showed that Wikipedians with denser networks tended to have lower adminship status, consistent with our structural holes hypothesis. The linear model had an adjusted R^2 of 0.255, and the logistic model had a log likelihood of 483.7. Comparing this model with the base model confirmed that structural holes also offered explanatory power to

adminship (χ^2 of $133.1 - 103.9 = 29.2$ at 3 degrees of freedom: $p < 0.001$). However, when constraint alone was regressed on adminship as a single index of structural holes, it was not found to be significantly related in either the linear ($p = 0.105$) or logistic (0.086) model. The linear model had an adjusted R^2 of 0.177, and the logistic model had a $-2LL$ of 512.0. This single-index structural-holes model added a negligible amount of explanatory power beyond the base model of control variables (difference in $\chi^2 = 3.732$; $p = 0.053$ at 1 d.f.). This indicated that the componentized measure of structural holes was necessary to identify significant effects, probably because of the lack of significance of the hierarchy components, and the questionable significance of density.

6. Discussion and implications

We found that, both direct and indirect ties were positively related to the administrative rights accorded in the OSS community. The number of direct connections of a participant with others indicated those with whom the Wikipedian had discussed. Discussion indicated that the contributors to the talk page actually associated comments with user names, which enabled them to know and respect each other. Among the Wikipedians, direct and indirect ties were highly correlated ($r = 0.985$).

Table 3
The impact of network closure on performance

Adminship	Linear regression		Logistic regression		Ordinal logit	
	Coef.	$p > t $	Coef.	$p > z $	Coef.	$p > z $
First edit	0.000	0.000***	-0.002	0.000***	-0.002	0.000***
Total edits	0.000	0.009***	0.000	0.004***	0.000	0.006***
Direct ties	0.002	0.000***	0.006	0.000***	0.007	0.000***
Constant	14.8	0.000***	59.4	0.000***		
$R^2 = 0.25$; adjusted $R^2 = 0.24$; $p > F = 0.000$ ***			$-2LL = 490.6$; χ^2 (3 d.f.) = 131.0; $p > \chi^2 = 0.000$ ***		$-2LL = 665.0$; χ^2 (3 d.f.) = 135.0; $p > \chi^2 = 0.000$ ***	

*** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4
 The impact of structural holes on performance

Adminship	Linear regression		Logistic regression		Ordinal logit	
	Coef.	$p > t $	Coef.	$p > z $	Coef.	$p > z $
First edit	0.000	0.000***	−0.002	0.000**	−0.002	0.000***
Total edits	0.000	0.039**	0.000	0.010**	0.000	0.029**
Size	0.002	0.000***	0.006	0.000***	0.006	0.000***
Density	−0.018	0.021**	−0.057	0.137	−0.084	0.014**
Hierarchy	−0.500	0.137	−2.314	0.183	−2.444	0.138
Constant	17.6	0.000***	72.7	0.000***		
$R^2 = 0.26$; adjusted $R^2 = 0.26$; $p > F = 0.000$ ***		$-2LL = 483.7$; $\chi^2 (5 \text{ d.f.}) = 133.1$; $p > \chi^2 = 0.000$ ***		$-2LL = 646.9$; $\chi^2 (5 \text{ d.f.}) = 143.6$; $p > \chi^2 = 0.000$ ***		
Adminship	Linear regression		Logistic regression		Ordinal logit	
	Coef.	$p > t $	Coef.	$p > z $	Coef.	$p > z $
First edit	−0.001	0.000***	−0.002	0.000***	−0.002	0.000***
Total edits	0.000	0.000***	0.000	0.000***	0.000	0.000***
Constraint	−0.439	0.105	−3.948	0.086*	−4.917	0.0502*
Constant	22.6	0.000***	78.0	0.000***		
$R^2 = 0.18$; adjusted $R^2 = 0.18$; $p > F = 0.000$ ***		$-2LL = 512.0$; $\chi^2 (3 \text{ d.f.}) = 109.6$; $p > \chi^2 = 0.000$ ***		$-2LL = 699.2$; $\chi^2 (3 \text{ d.f.}) = 100.8$; $p > \chi^2 = 0.000$ ***		

* $p < 0.1$.
 ** $p < 0.05$.
 *** $p < 0.01$.

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Thus, the number of indirect ties significantly and positively related to their administrative status. Because Wikipedia is a very active community with over 500 participants who contribute more than 100 edits each month, it is no surprise that those who have many direct ties would also have many indirect ties.

The structural holes argument posits that social capital, leading to better performance, is due to a person’s ability to exploit gaps in the social network. We found that the effective size component of structural holes was significantly and positively related to adminship, as we hypothesized. Density was also negatively related, but this effect was significant only in the linear regression model that differentiated regular Wikipedians, regular administrators, and super administrators; it was not significant when we grouped both kinds of administrators. However, the hierarchy of the network was not significantly related to adminship. Nor did the composite constraint measure have a significant effect.

Volunteers who formed a dense and closed network with many direct ties linking alters in the Wikipedia community appeared to be separated by others who did not belong to the network. We suspected that the participants who did not form a dense network were reluctant to create a new relationship with someone who had already established a dense network. When a participant interacted extensively only with the other participants in their network, the people who did not

belong did not appreciate their contribution or even just ignore their postings. This suggested that people should broaden their network in order to be recognized by others.

Our results also indicated that the size of a person’s network significantly affected their adminship. Burt argued that networks with larger effective sizes tended to provide more information that could be used to exploit structural holes. We further suggest that with a network of larger size there are greater chances that holes exist.

We found that social network hierarchy did not affect adminship. In the case of Wikipedia, adminship is granted through a communal vote. Even when there is a central Wikipedian who is well connected, he or she cannot help others gain adminship in any way other than giving their support and casting their single vote. The Wikipedia community has a very low power distance culture, thus hierarchy has little effect.

The overall structural hole index (constraint) had a negative effect, as hypothesized, but was only marginally significant, with an average p value of 0.10 across both models. This is not surprising, considering that hierarchy is not significant, and that density is not consistently so.

6.1. *Implications for open source contributors and communities*

Although open source contributors are generally altruistic, they nonetheless often have a desire to be

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807 recognized for their contribution by means more
808 tangible than just the satisfaction of contributing to a
809 social good. Only about 512 of 8893 English
810 Wikipedians by June 2004 were involved in the
811 adminship process. But there were 581 of the 8893
812 who contributed 100 edits in that month, while in our
813 total sample (465 Wikipedians), the average number
814 of edits per month was 240.4, with a standard deviation
815 of 298. This clearly indicates that the Wikipedians
816 in our study were among the most active in the
817 community.

818 A large number of the direct ties came from
819 participating in many diverse articles and thus being
820 able to interact on talk pages with a wider spectrum of
821 contributors. It is not sufficient to simply participate in
822 many different articles in the same category, as this might
823 expose the Wikipedian only to the same set of coauthors.
824 More generally, in an open source community, con-
825 tributors who want higher status must try to participate in
826 a wide diversity of projects within the community. Of
827 course, genuine skill is hard to fake, and only those with
828 multifaceted abilities can do this. But this indicated that
829 open source communities tend to reward such persons.

830 In accordance with Burt's findings, our results
831 showed that a degree of density, one of the elements of
832 network constraints, had a generally negative impact on
833 performance as measured by obtaining administrative
834 rights. This result suggested that failure to diversify
835 gave collaborators little opportunity to be known and
836 commended by promotion, but this could also be
837 perceived as unfriendly or insular and harm a partici-
838 pant's opportunities for promotion.

839 In an open source community, high density
840 indicates that several people are working on the same
841 project. In the model that only distinguished between
842 those with some administrative status and those with
843 none, density was not found to add social capital
844 significantly. This indicated that regular open source
845 participants had no need to fear participating in
846 heavily supported projects—in fact, this could expose
847 them to more people, and increase the social capital.
848 However, when we distinguished between higher-
849 level and lower-level administrators, dense networks
850 apparently reduced participants' chances for promo-
851 tion, as the structural hole theory hypothesizes. This
852 would suggest that when open source participants
853 have already established their status in the community
854 and want to differentiate themselves further, they
855 should seek projects or articles that are not widely
856 frequented, in order to extend their skill base and
857 exploit the structural holes that accrue from diversify-
858 ing interests.

6.2. Implications for other open source communities

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861 Considering the importance of formal community
862 recognition and status in motivating the performance of
863 the highest performers, our findings could be helpful in
864 guiding open source community leaders in improving
865 their volunteer force. In communities where there is no
866 limit on the number of administrators, it would be
867 helpful to promote as many participants as possible to
868 ranks of higher privilege and responsibility. This study
869 has shown that the direct ties, indirect ties, and effective
870 size of a person's network are important sources of
871 social capital. These show that the more the number of
872 interactions with a participant, the better his or her
873 performance in the community. Contrary to what might
874 be expected in a traditional organization, there is little
875 effect of hierarchy in this case, indicating that the power
876 of other members – and the power of the members to
877 whom the ego is tied – is not relevant. We can only
878 apply this conclusion to communities like Wikipedia,
879 where recognition and promotion are conferred by
880 democratic processes, which is not usually the case in
881 open source communities. This would suggest that open
882 source communities that want its members to maxi-
883 mally benefit from their ties should implement such
884 open methods of according ranks.

885 Despite many differences (i.e., nature of the product,
886 member characteristics, goals, etc.), Wikipedia follows
887 the same principles by which other OSS communities
888 operate. Therefore the results of our study could be
889 generalized to other active OSS networks. It is worth
890 noting that the Wikipedia contributors who are most
891 interested in recognition rewards happen to be the most
892 prolific. It is therefore in the interests of community
893 leaders to understand the value of social networks and
894 re-configure their structure in ways that best mobilize
895 the embedded social resource.

6.3. Implications for corporations

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897 Recently, corporations have become interested in
898 implementing the Wiki as their new knowledge
899 management mechanism. In fact, it has already helped
900 several companies transform the way they brainstorm,
901 track projects and coordinate marketing, while allowing
902 them to preserve their physical resources (eliminate
903 meetings, reduce conference calls, etc.) [25].

904 However, managers should be aware of a potential
905 negative consequence as a result of adopting the Wiki as
906 their coordination channel. Social capital is a funda-
907 mental resource that facilitates smooth knowledge

907 sharing. The Wiki as a coordination mechanism is likely
 908 to succeed when a company can construct or reconfigure
 909 its network in which both categories of social capital are
 910 efficiently produced and reproduced. Companies may
 911 find it extremely difficult to ensure “pure” voluntary
 912 participation; norms or trust must be present or
 913 opportunism and shirking are likely to occur. Therefore,
 914 to avoid failures, managers may have to provide financial
 915 incentives or use their authority to force participation.
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6.4. Implications for academia

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 918 Wiki technology has the potential to promote more
 919 research collaboration both within and across academic
 920 fields, providing a platform through which researchers
 921 who have never met can collaborate and produce
 922 intellectual capital. An open source encyclopedia has
 923 already been established for the IS research community,
 924 using Wiki technology (<http://ispedia.terry.uga.edu>). In
 925 fact, each academic field could develop its own OCE.

7. Conclusion

926
 927 Despite much interest in the development of open
 928 source software, little research has been performed in this
 929 area. In particular, due to the difficulty of data collection,
 930 few empirical studies have been attempted. Based on the
 931 perspective of social capital, we examined empirically
 932 the extent to which network closures and structural holes
 933 in the network influenced participants’ performance. Our
 934 approach may help address one issue that is often cited as
 935 a key challenge to open source community stakeholders:
 936 how to keep the interest of participants and motivate them
 937 to continue to contribute. Economic incentives might
 938 dilute the original spirit over which OSS communities
 939 are established and may have negative consequences.
 940 One alternative for maintaining members’ interests is to
 941 construct or adjust the network structure to attract
 942 participants and improve its social capital resources.
 943 Furthermore, OSS leaders should fine-tune or reconfi-
 944 gure their network to be efficient with equilibrium
 945 between the network closures and structural holes.

Uncited references

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 947 [3,13,16,17,19,26,34,46,53].

Acknowledgements

948
 949 We gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance
 950 of Claudio Vejar. This research was partially funded by
 951 Fonds de recherché sur la societe et la culture [FQRSC

2006-NP-105602], and by the Faculty Research
 Development Program of Concordia University.

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Please cite this article in press as: C. Okoli, W. Oh, Investigating recognition-based performance in an open content community: A social capital perspective, *Information & Management* (2007), doi:10.1016/j.im.2006.12.007